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Abstract 
The mindset theory posits that people have less favorable beliefs while deliberating on actions or 
goals than while planning and implementing them. This is thought to be a self-regulatory mechanism 
that helps people choose reasonable goals, on one hand, and persist in goal pursuit, on the other. In the 
present experiment we tested the hypothesis that the beliefs of implemental participants differ from 
those of deliberative ones only in case that favorable views would not set them up for failure and disap-
pointment. Participants in a deliberative or in an implemental mindset were asked to compare with two 
other persons with respect to a set of achievement-related activities. They were also told that they 
would have to compete with one of these persons in a motor-skills task. It could be shown that the 
participants generally tended to rate the comparison targets as being worse off. As in former experi-
ments, this tendency was, however, reduced in deliberative participants. In addition, it was reduced in 
implemental participants when they expected to compete with the comparison target later on. Imple-
mental participants did thus have more favorable views than deliberative ones only if they had not to 
compete with the comparison target. This seems to be a good strategy to enhance the feelings of one's 
own competence without running the risk of failure and embarrassment. 
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If people have to evaluate personal prospects or possible risks, they usually tend to reveal 
a comparative optimism. They rate their own chances more favorably than those of other 
people and believe that their abilities are above average (Svenson, 1981; Taylor & Brown, 
1988). This kind of social comparison may enhance self-esteem and has beneficial effects on 
attention, goal setting, and problem solving as well as on physical and mental health (see 
Armor & Taylor, 1998; Aspinwall, Richter, & Hoffman, 2001; Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997 
for review and discussion). The need to enhance one's self-esteem or to maintain a positive 
sense of the self (self-enhancement) (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Tesser, 1988) is, however, not 
the only goal of social comparison. Since social comparison has been assumed to satisfy a 
number of personal needs, three main motivational processes have been discussed to underlie 
the engagement in it, as well as to determine its direction (e.g. Wayment & Taylor, 1995; 
Taylor, Wayment, & Carrillo, 1996). Festinger (1954) proposed that a motivation to evaluate 
one's own abilities and opinions drives people to rely on social-comparison information 
especially in cases when no absolute standards are available. Traditionally, it has been ac-
cepted that social comparison serves this need for accurate self-appraisal and meets it 
through a comparison with similar others (lateral social comparison). The above mentioned 
need for self-enhancement is supposed to be met through a second motivational process 
called downward social comparison. That means that people compare themselves to others 
whose performance is worse than their own. Third, social comparison could aim at improv-
ing oneself (Wood, 1989) and this need for self-improvement seems to be best met by a 
comparison to those whose outcomes are better than one's own (upward social comparison) 
(Taylor, Wayment, & Carrillo, 1996). It is important to consider that upward, downward and 
lateral social comparisons can not only manifest themselves in the choice of a comparison 
target, but they can also find an expression in the evaluation and description of a given per-
son one is being compared to. 
As mentioned above, people generally tend to rate their own prospects more favorably 
than those of other people. Does this mean that they are exclusively guided by self-
enhancement needs? Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) have found support for the hypothesis 
that they are not. In a set of experiments they could show that people were less inclined to 
engage in downward social comparison when they were deliberating on potential actions and 
goals as compared to when they were planning or implementing them. This finding is in line 
with the mindset theory (Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999). Mindsets are concep-
tualized as cognitive orientations associated with the different action phases and functional 
for the aims characteristic for each of them. As such, mindsets are supposed to enable and 
facilitate the fulfillment of the different tasks that people confront before and after they have 
met a decision. People deliberating on which action to take or which goal to pursue reveal 
the so-called deliberative mindset. The purpose of this state of mind is to maintain an objec-
tive and accurate evaluation of one's own abilities in order to set realistic and approachable 
goals. People in a deliberative state of mind consider the advantages and disadvantages of 
alternative actions, as well as the accessibility of potential goals in a well-balanced manner. 
The deliberative mindset thus contributes to preventing people from choosing and stating too 
difficult goals they then cannot achieve. In this sense, the motivation to self-assess and self-
improve should prevail when people are deliberating and it thus promotes lateral or upward 
social comparisons. After having made a decision and chosen a goal, people proceed to an 
implemental mindset. This mindset provides for an optimistic attitude and fuels self-
assurance and positive mood. Thereby it facilitates the successful realization of the chosen R. M. Puca & I. Slavova  46 
goals and keeps away uncertainty and dysfunctional doubts, which could endanger it. It can 
be expected that the prevailing motivation associated with the implemental mindset is self-
enhancement. People in this state of mind should therefore be more inclined to engage in 
downward social comparison than deliberative mindset people. With the present experiment 
we wanted to test the hypothesis that this, however, will not always be the case.  
Puca (2004) hypothesized that implemental people reduce their optimistic attitudes when 
being overly optimistic would bring them into trouble. Some of the potential pitfalls of im-
plemental participants’ favorable beliefs have been discussed for optimism in general (for 
reviews see Armor & Taylor, 1998; Radcliffe & Klein, 2002). One pitfall relevant for im-
plemental participants is that unrealistic high expectations are more likely to be disconfirmed 
than realistic ones. Disconfirmation could lead to negative feelings, which are maladaptive 
for the effective task fulfillment. If high expectations are stated in public and can be objec-
tively evaluated, one additionally runs the risk of compromising oneself. Puca (2001) tested 
participants’ subjective probability of success in deliberative and implemental states of mind. 
She could show that implemental participants were more optimistic than deliberative ones 
only on an implicit measure of subjective probability, but not in their explicit performance 
predictions. This implicit measure reflected the private expectations of the participants. It 
was derived from the time needed by the participants to predict whether or not they would be 
successful at a given trial of a motor-skills task. The explicit measure consisted of the num-
ber of explicit success predictions. These explicit predictions of the kind “I will succeed in 
this trial” are associated with a higher risk because they imply a public statement that can be 
verified and disconfirmed. Thus, implemental participants tended to avoid this risk.  
Another pitfall of implemental optimism is associated with the fact that mindsets are not 
necessarily task-specific but rather general cognitive orientations. Mindset effects possess 
the ability of generalizing on tasks and actions not associated with their induction (Gollwit-
zer & Bayer, 1999). It has been repeatedly demonstrated that implemental people are not 
only optimistic when striving for the goals they choose, but also have favorable beliefs con-
cerning subsequent or parallel actions or goals. For example, Gagné and Lydon (2001) tested 
participants who were in a predecisional (deliberative) or in a postdecisional (implemental) 
action phase with respect to the choice of an university program. In this study, implemental 
participants as compared to deliberative ones made overly optimistic predictions when asked 
how long they expected their romantic relationship to last. The danger associated with this 
mindset transfer to unrelated tasks implies the possibility of making risky choices or setting 
exaggerated goals for parallel or subsequent actions while in an implemental state of mind.  
Puca (2004) found, however, that implemental people even though more optimistic than 
deliberative ones did not make more risky choices. Participants randomly assigned either to 
the deliberative- or to the implemental-mindset condition were asked to set themselves a goal 
for a motor-skills task they had just become acquainted with. In addition, they had to state 
their confidence in attaining this goal. In accordance with the predictions, implemental opti-
mism did not express itself in goal setting. Implemental participants were still more confi-
dent in reaching their goals than were deliberative ones. Thus, they experienced more posi-
tive feelings (confidence) without running the risk of setting exaggerated goals that they 
couldn’t achieve. 
To examine the effects of the mindsets on social comparison, Taylor and Gollwitzer 
(1995) induced deliberative and implemental mindsets by asking people either to name a 
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then had to compare themselves to an average person with respect to various controllable 
and uncontrollable risks. It could be shown that participants tended to engage in downward 
social comparison. They believed that they were less vulnerable to health risks and negative 
events than the average person. The tendency for downward comparison was less pro-
nounced in deliberative than in implemental participants. This kind of downward social 
comparison did not imply a great risk, anyway. First, it was not possible to check objectively 
whether participants were actually more or less at risk than the average person. Second, there 
was no immediate danger that the participants’ tendency to involve in a downward compari-
son would affect their self-regulative behavior because no relevant subsequent actions were 
required within the study.  
What would, however, happen if considering other people to be worse off could bring 
one in danger? Exclusive downward social comparisons could sometimes jeopardize suc-
cessful task fulfillment and endanger self-esteem and self-presentational aims. If one under-
estimates, for example, one's opponent, one runs the risk of underestimating the efforts nec-
essary to outperform him or her, as well. Thus, downward social comparison may augment 
the objective probability of failure. In addition, failure may become even more aversive if 
people loose against an opponent they previously described as less competent than them-
selves. We therefore predict that not only deliberative states of mind should reduce people’s 
tendency for downward comparison but also the prospect of competition with another per-
son. As a consequence implemental participants are expected to differ from deliberative ones 
in their social-comparison strategy only if they will not have to compete with the comparison 
target. Specifically, if implemental participants are given the opportunity to compare with 
people with whom they will not have to compete, they engage more in downward compari-
son than deliberative participants. That means they will perceive the abilities of “irrelevant” 
other people as worse off in order to meet their own self-enhancement needs. In contrast, 
when implemental participants have to compare themselves with a future competitor, the 
need to stay as accurate as possible in one's self- and other-evaluations will prevail and they 
will thus be as cautious as deliberative participants. The first purpose of this study was to test 
this presumption. The second option was to examine whether implemental participants’ 
tendency to involve in a downward comparison can be explained in terms of a general ten-
dency to assign negative attributes to other people.  
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
A total of 52 (43 female) persons between 18 and 40 years participated in the experi-
ment. Their mean age was 24.88 (SD = 5.78). Most of them were psychology majors, who 
received course credit for their participation. Of the 52 participants 26 were randomly as-
signed to the deliberative-mindset condition and 26 to the implemental-mindset condition. 
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Procedure 
 
A female experimenter tested participants individually. At the beginning of the experi-
ment participants were asked to work on a challenging motor-skills game, which constituted 
the basis for the competition announced later on. This game was based on traditional follow-
the-wire games, which can only be mastered by a steady hand. With a handle in one hand 
participants had to follow a wire with several loops from it’s left to it’s right end and back 
again. They had to repeat this for two minutes as many times as possible and without touch-
ing the wire. After participants had completed this task, they obtained feedback about their 
absolute performance result. 
They were then randomly assigned to the different mindset conditions. Mindsets were 
induced with the help of a technique frequently used in this area of research (e.g., Gollwitzer 
& Kinney, 1989; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995; Puca, 2004). Participants were told that they 
now had to work on a different task. In the deliberative group they had to name an unsolved 
problem in their lives. They then had to list some possible negative and positive conse-
quences of making a specific decision. Participants in the implemental group had to name 
and describe a planned or ongoing project in their lives. They then had to list some important 
steps necessary to carry out the project. 
After completing this task, participants were told that there would be a second run in the 
follow-the-wire game and that they would have to compete in it with another person. They 
were then informed that we were interested in their ideas about their future competitor and 
about a second person who would represent the competitor of another participant. For this 
purpose we showed them vague descriptions of two persons of the same sex as their own. In 
the following we call the described person competitor when he or she was introduced as the 
participant's competitor and non-competitor when he or she was introduced as a competitor 
of another participant. After they had read the first description, we asked the participants to 
imagine the personality of the respective person. Offering only vague descriptions of com-
parison targets is a common method in research on social comparison. In the study of Taylor 
and Gollwitzer (1995) participants had to evaluate themselves and an average college stu-
dent. The comparison-target, thus, constituted a hypothetical other and may for this reason 
have represented a product of the participants' imagination (for a discussion see Wood, 
1996). In the present experiment, we tried to make the construction of the comparison targets 
more transparent. Therefore we asked the participants to describe their ideas of the two com-
parison target persons by using a total of 30 adjectives (10 positive, 10 neutral, and 10 nega-
tive), which were not achievement related. The participants had to think about the respective 
person and to check those 10 of these adjectives which they thought would describe that 
person best. Then, they proceeded in the same way with the second target person. Competi-
tor and non-competitor were introduced in random order. This procedure enabled us to test 
whether participants in different action phases tend to construct comparison targets in a 
generally positive or negative manner. Since these adjectives were not achievement- but only 
personality-related, we would be able to find an answer to the question if the implemental 
mindset could be associated with a fundamental tendency to devalue other people’s qualities 
and their personality characteristics in general or if its effects are more differentiated and 
adaptable.  
The "constructions" of the competitor and the non-competitor were followed by the so-
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themselves using a list of ten achievement-related activities. After completing this social-
comparison task, participants were asked whether they had thought of a specific person they 
knew when figuring out what the competitor or the non-competitor would be like. 
 
 
Apparatus and Materials 
 
Follow-the-wire game. The game consisted of a wire with several loops that was attached 
to a wooden panel at both its ends. The participants had to move a wooden handle with a 
metal ring at the top along the wire, which went through the ring. A little lamp was con-
nected to the wire and the ring. Every time the ring touched the wire an electric circuit closed 
and the lamp lit up. The lamp also lit up when one end of the wire was reached. 
Short Personality Descriptions. For the social-comparison task the participants were pre-
sented with two file-cards containing information about their competitor and the non-
competitor, respectively. On each card the first letter of the target's last name was printed 
(Mr. or Mrs. M for the competitor and Mr. or Mrs. O for the non-competitor). In addition, 
three neutral personality adjectives, which were taken from a study by Wentura, Rother-
mund, and Bak (2000), were printed on the card. These were not achievement related ("mod-
ern", "complicated", and "harmless", or "normal", "theoretical", and "gingerly"). Information 
about the competitor's or non-competitor's favorite color ("turquoise" or "orange"), his or her 
favorite vacation area ("Italy" or "Greece"), and his or her favorite quiz show ("Das Quiz" or 
"Wer wird Millionär" ["The Quiz" or "Who Becomes Millionaire"]) was available, too. 
These pieces of information were randomly assigned to the competitor and to the non-
competitor respectively. 
Personality adjectives. Ten positive, ten neutral, and ten negative adjectives were pre-
sented to the participants for describing the competitor's or the non-competitor's personality, 
respectively. These were standardized adjectives taken from a study by Wentura et al. 
(2000). They are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: 
Personality adjectives for the construction of the comparison targets. The participants had to 
think about the respective person and to check 10 of these adjectives which they thought 
would describe that person best 
 
positive negative  neutral 
relaxed insulting    strenuous 
friendly unimaginative  busy 
imaginative hostile  curious 
considerate intolerant  realistic 
shows solidarity  isolated  reserved 
independent perfidious  systematic 
carefree dependent  unobtrusive 
versatile antisocial  choosey 
warm-hearted embittered  absent-minded 
affectionate compulsive guarded R. M. Puca & I. Slavova  50 
Social comparison. For the social-comparison task, the participants were presented with 
a list of ten activities. Two of them were directly related to the follow-the-wire game and the 
remaining eight activities were generally achievement related but not related to the game. At 
the top of the list the participants read, for example, the sentence "What do you imagine is 
Mrs. M like as compared to you?" There were three answer options: "worse than me", "as 
good as I am" and "better than me." The participants had to check with regard to each activ-
ity which of these options fitted best. The list of activities can be seen from Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2: 
A list of the achievement-related activities for the social-comparison task. The participants 
had to state for each activity or skill whether they thought that the competitor and the non-
competitor were worse off, as good as or better than they were 
 
Achievement-related activities and skills 
Number of trials in the motor-skills task 
Number of mistakes in the motor-skills task 
Arithmetic 
Verbal competence 
Solving complex problems 
Learning a foreign language 
Sports 
Teamwork 
Handcraft skills 
Finding a way in an unfamiliar environment 
 
 
Results 
 
Manipulation Check 
 
Mindset Manipulation. Of the 52 participants 21 wrote about career-related goals, 14 de-
scribed life-stile-related goals and 17 described goals concerning interpersonal relationships. 
All participants rated their goals as rather important. On a scale ranging from 1 (not impor-
tant at all) to 6 (very important) the mean was M = 4.96 (SD = 1.36). The importance of the 
goals did not vary by goal domain or mindset, all Fs < 1.  
Imagining the competitor and the non-competitor. Only four of the deliberative- and five 
of the implemental-mindset participants thought of friends or acquaintances when describing 
the competitor. As the descriptions of the non-competitor are concerned, three participants in 
the deliberative condition and six in the implemental condition thought of people they knew. 
To test whether deliberative and implemental participants differed in their descriptions of the 
competitor's and the non-competitor's personalities the data (number of adjectives checked) 
were subjected to a mixed-design 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA. This analysis considered one between-
group factor and two repeated-measures factors. The between-group factor was the Mindset 
condition (deliberative/implemental), and the repeated-measures factors were the Valence of 
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non-competitor). This analysis revealed only a significant main effect for the Valence. There 
was no effect of the mindsets on the personality ratings at all. Both deliberative and imple-
mental participants attributed more positive than negative adjectives to both competitor and 
non-competitor, F(1,50) = 63.63, p < .001, η
2 = .56. The means were M = 3.42 (SD = 1.21) 
for the positive adjectives and M = 1.42 (SD = 0.82) for the negative adjectives. 
 
 
Social comparison 
 
To obtain a measure of social comparison participants' ratings for the achievement-
related activities were first coded and then summed up. When the participant had checked 
the option "the competitor/non-competitor is worse than me", -1 was coded. Zero was coded 
when the participant checked "the competitor/non-competitor is as good as I am", and 1 was 
coded if he or she thought that the competitor/non-competitor was better off.  
The ratings for the competitor and the non-competitor were summed up separately and 
the sum of the ratings was taken as a measure of social comparison. A negative sum resulted 
if a participant saw him- or herself as being superior to the other person (competitor and non-
competitor, respectively) more often than equal or inferior. A negative sum thus indicates 
downward social comparison. In contrast, a positive sum resulted if a participant saw the 
other person as being superior more often than as being equal or inferior. Consequently a 
positive sum indicates upward social comparison. 
The two items concerning the follow-the-wire game and the eight achievement-related 
items were analyzed separately for two reasons. First, we expected that participants’ ratings 
are influenced by their prior performance when they have to compare their ability for the 
game with the target persons’ one. We therefore used participants’ prior performance as a 
covariate when analyzing mindset-effects on the follow-the-wire game ratings. Second, in 
contrast to the eight achievement-related items, participants’ ratings for the follow-the-wire-
game items could be tested objectively. It has been repeatedly shown that there is less room 
for optimism when predictions and performance ratings can be easily disconfirmed (see 
Puca, 2004 for a discussion).  
The summed up evaluations of the two follow-the-wire-game items were subjected to a 2 
x 2 mixed design ANCOVA with Mindset condition as a between-group factor and Status of 
the target (competitor/ non-competitor) as a repeated-measures factor. Two measures of 
participants’ prior performance were used as covariates. These were the number of trials they 
achieved and the number of mistakes they made. This ANCOVA revealed a significant inter-
action between Mindset condition and Status of the target, F(1,48) = 4.83, p < .05, η
2 = .09 
(see Table 3). An inspection of the descriptive statistics showed that means were positive in 
the deliberative-like in the implemental-mindset group. Thus, neither deliberative nor im-
plemental participants tended to downward comparison for the follow-the-wire-game items. 
The interaction results from the finding that implemental participants’ ratings were a bit less 
positive for the non-competitor and a bit more positive for the competitor than deliberative 
participants’ ratings. Separate ANCOVAs showed, however, that the difference between 
implemental and deliberative participants reached significance neither for the comparison 
with the competitor, F(1,48) = 1.17, n.s., nor for the comparison with the non-competitor, 
F(1,48) = 2.62, n.s.  
 R. M. Puca & I. Slavova  52 
Table 3: 
Mean comparison scores for participants in deliberative and implemental states of mind 
evaluating the competitor’s and non-competitor’s competency in the follow-the-wire-game. 
Positive scores indicate that in sum the participants rated the comparison target as being 
better than they are. 
 
 Mindset 
 Deliberative 
(n = 26) 
 Implemental 
(n = 26) 
  M SD    M SD 
Competitor  .58  .65  .81  1.07 
Non-Competitor  .91  .88  .44  .99 
Note. The number of trials participants achieved and the number of mistakes they made in the 
game are used as covariates. The means are adjusted for these covariates. 
 
To analyze the sum of the evaluations of the eight achievement-related items, we used a 
2 x 2 mixed design ANOVA with Mindset condition as a between-group factor and Status of 
the target (competitor/ non-competitor) as a repeated-measures factor. This analysis revealed 
a significant interaction between Mindset condition and Status of the target, F(1,50) = 4.30, 
p < .05, η
2 = .08 (see Figure 1). As predicted, the evaluation of the non-competitor was more 
negative for implemental than for deliberative participants, F(1,50) = 6.10, p < .05, η
2= .11. 
There was, however, no difference between the two mindset groups when the competitor was 
evaluated F(1,50) = .12, n.s. 
 
Figure 1: 
Mean comparison scores with standard errors for participants in deliberative and 
implemental states of mind evaluating competitors and non-competitors in eight 
achievement-related activities. Negative scores indicate that in sum the participants rated the 
comparison target as being worse than they were.  
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Discussion 
 
The present results are consistent with the prediction of Gollwitzer's mindset theory that 
positive illusions vary in the course of action (Gollwitzer, 1990, 1991). To date, several 
studies have demonstrated that people display less positive illusions and less favorable ex-
pectations while deliberating on actions or goals than while planning or implementing them 
(e.g. Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989; Gagné & Lydon, 2001; Puca, 2001; Armor & Taylor, 
2003). In the present experiment, deliberative participants’ perceived superiority over a 
comparison target was reduced as compared to that of implemental participants. A similar 
reduction of the favorable beliefs of deliberative participants has been observed in a study by 
Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995). The present study goes, however, beyond this finding by 
demonstrating that implemental participants can sometimes suspend their favorable views, 
too. As expected, implemental participants engaged in less downward comparison when they 
were told that they would have to compete with the comparison target person later on.  
This finding is in line with recent results of a study by Puca (2004) showing that imple-
mental participants are optimistic in a way that does not set them up for failure and disap-
pointment. Beliefs of superiority over others can enhance or maintain self-esteem and can, 
therefore, be beneficial for efficient goal pursuit. These beliefs bear no risk if one feels supe-
rior to people with whom one will not have to compete. If the comparison target is, however, 
a future opponent, beliefs of superiority may be detrimental because of the risk of underesti-
mating the effort necessary for the competition. This may lead to negative feelings in two 
ways. First, if people don't make an effort, they won't succeed in surpassing their competitor. 
Second, a failure may be most embarrassing when people have explicitly stated that they are 
better than their competitor.  
The hypothesis that implemental participants engage more in downward comparison than 
deliberative ones when the target is no opponent could not be supported for the items that 
referred to the follow-the-wire game. Like deliberative participants, implemental participants 
did not engage in downward social comparisons when they had to compare their ability in 
the game with that of both target persons. Nevertheless, participants’ ratings were biased by 
their mindsets. Implemental participants tended to rate the non-competitor a bit less positive 
than the competitor. It is not surprising that participants did not show downward social com-
parison concerning the game because participants’ achievement in this game could be tested 
objectively. This result is in line with the notion that people tend to make less optimistic 
predictions when these predictions can be easily tested (e.g; Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernan-
dez, 1996; Armor & Taylor, 1998; Puca, 2001). The participants did not have to compete 
with the non-competitor directly but they believed that there would be results available for 
that person, too, because he or she had to play the game as well.  
To summarize, even though mindset effects could also be observed on the ratings of the 
follow-the-wire game, downward social comparison was demonstrated only for those 
achievement-related activities that could not be tested objectively in the present experiment. 
Implemental participants engaged more in it than did deliberative ones. This was, however, 
only the case when they had to evaluate a person against whom they did not have to compete 
later on. Thus, people seem to adapt their beliefs not only to the different action phases, but 
also to different situational demands within these phases.  
For an appropriate interpretation of the present findings, the method used to induce the 
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the participants in the deliberative group to name a personal decision problem and in the 
implemental group to name a planned project. Later on they had to compare two persons to 
themselves with respect to several achievement-related activities. This comparison had noth-
ing to do with the named problem or project. Nevertheless implemental participants showed 
more downward social comparison with respect to the non-competitor than did deliberative 
participants. As mentioned above, several studies have shown that mindset effects induced in 
this way generalize to tasks that are not responsible for their induction (e.g. Taylor & Goll-
witzer, 1995; Gagné & Lydon, 2001; Puca, 2004). Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995) pointed out 
that mindsets include two kinds of cognitions. First, these are cognitions that are specific to 
the decision problem or the planned project. Second, these are more general cognitions that 
constitute optimal conditions for deliberation and implementation respectively. In this sense 
the mindset transfer to an unrelated task may be functional because it can have an effect back 
on the original deliberation or implementation. For instance, the implemental mindset biases 
people’s cognitions in a way that they believe they can reach their goal as well as in a way 
that allows them to have a positive self-view in general. It can enhance participants’ general 
self-appraisal if they see others as being worse off. This may also be helpful for the imple-
mentation of the original task. In our study participants saw only the non-competitor as being 
worse off but not their future competitor. This is in line with our predictions because seeing 
the competitor as being worse off bears the risk of negative feelings. It may be embarrassing 
if participants loose against a person they have previously rated as being less competent then 
they are. This feeling of embarrassment may undermine the pursuit of the original project. In 
sum, the present data again support the notion that mindsets are general cognitive orienta-
tions and as such do not only affect specific tasks.  
In studies concerning the mindset theory, some possible mediating mechanisms for the 
mindset effects have been discussed. In the present experiment, it has been tested whether 
implemental participants’ tendency to involve in a downward comparison could be explained 
in terms of a general tendency to see other people in a negative light. It could, however, be 
shown that implemental participants did not differ from deliberative ones when they had to 
choose among a number of non-achievement-related adjectives in order to simply describe 
the target's personality. Since mindsets are thought to be flexible, adaptable and functional, 
mindset effects are not expected to be undifferentiated. For instance, it would not necessarily 
enhance implemental participants’ self-esteem if they perceived other people as intolerant or 
hostile. Sometimes goals cannot be implemented without the help of other people. If the 
implemental mindset would generally predispose people to see others in a negative manner 
implemental participants could have problems to ask others for help if necessary. 
It has not been tested in the present experiment whether participants’ emotional states 
that may have been manipulated through the mindset induction could be responsible for the 
mindset effects on social comparison. Implemental action phases could favor positive emo-
tional states, which in turn could be the reason for the postdecisional optimism. While some 
evidence does exist that postdecisional participants experience more positive emotions than 
predecisional ones, the findings concerning this phenomenon are neither uniform, nor clear. 
Taylor and Gollwitzer (1995), for example, could show that postdecisional participants re-
ported more positive feelings than their predecisional counterparts. A mediator analysis did 
not allow the conclusion, however, that these feelings could be considered to mediate be-
tween the experimentally manipulated action phases on one hand and the risk ratings on the 
other. Other studies found no differences between pre- and postdecisional participants con-Mindsets and social comparison  55 
cerning their emotional states at all (Brandstätter & Frank, 2002; Puca, 2004). In sum, nega-
tive emotions can not be considered a necessary constituting part of the deliberative mindset, 
nor could positive emotions be considered to be a necessary constituting part of the imple-
mental mindset.  
Our findings that implemental participants felt more superior to a comparison target per-
son against whom they wouldn't have to compete leaves room for two possible interpreta-
tions. On the one hand, the implemental mindsets might have biased the self-evaluation of 
the participants, and thus, have lead to self-enhancement. In that case participants would 
have appraised themselves as particularly good with respect to the presented activities inde-
pendent of their evaluation of the target. They would have felt better off, even if they had 
considered the target person to be quite good her- or himself. On the other hand, the other-
evaluation might have been biased, as well, resulting in other-diminishment. This would 
have allowed participants to feel superior, while at the same time evaluating their own com-
petence realistically. One can, for example, realize that one is not very good at a certain task 
and at the same time consider the comparison target person as being even worse off with 
respect to the same activity. Within our paradigm, we cannot come to any conclusion as to 
which one of the two possible interpretations is true. We think, however, that this is not 
essential for the examination of our hypothesis. As this hypothesis stated that implemental 
participants feel superior to other people more often when this cannot undermine successful 
goal pursuit, it concerns only the comparative self-judgment and not the absolute self- or 
other-evaluation. Nevertheless it would be informative to test in future experiments whether 
self-evaluation or the evaluation of comparison target persons is biased by implemental 
mindsets. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The present findings can be integrated in a broader context of research in which potential 
benefits and risks of optimism are considered (Armor & Taylor, 1998; Radcliffe & Klein, 
2002). Within this research area optimism is supposed to have negative implications espe-
cially if it is not responsive to reality and the situational requirements. Taylor and Gollwitzer 
(1995) wondered whether this could also be true for the implemental mindset. They dis-
cussed that implementation might induce a form of tunnel vision, i.e. implemental partici-
pants could probably not take important information into account when making predictions 
about future events. The findings of the present experiment draw a step toward to an answer 
to this question. It provides further evidence that postdecisional optimism is not blind to the 
situational demands. Just as optimism can be reduced when people are deliberating, it can 
also be reduced in postdecisional action phases if it otherwise would bear risks for the suc-
cessful goal attainment.  
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